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International trade is more important to our nation today than
ever before. As the impact of international trade on the American
economy has grown, there has been a corresponding increase in
disputes within the international trade community: particularly
among nations, individuals, foreign and domestic manufacturers,
consumer groups, trade associations, labor unions and affected
citizens.
In view of the ever-increasing importance of the law of inter-
national trade, all members of the international trade community
should acquaint themselves with the jurisdiction of and practice
before the United States Court of International Trade. Even those
lawyers familiar with the practice before the court's predecessor,
the United States Customs Court, should note the significant
changes in the jurisdiction and powers of the court brought about
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and the Customs Courts Act
of 1980.1
On November 1, 1980, the effective date of the Customs Courts
Act, the Court of International Trade entered the mainstream of
the federal judicial system. As an Article III court, the Court of
International Trade has all the powers in law and equity possessed
by, or conferred by statute upon, a federal district court.2
Although the court is located in New York City, it is a national
court; a trial originating in the Court of International Trade may be
had in any United States courthouse or federal courtroom through-
out the country.3 Additionally, the court is authorized to hold
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1. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980); Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). For an introduction to the work of
the United States Court of International Trade, see De Concini, Introductory Statement (In-
ternational Trade Law Symposium), 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 431 (1981).
2. 1980 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (Supp. IV 1980).
3. Id. § 256(a).
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hearings in foreign countries. 4
With certain necessary exceptions, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence apply to all civil actions before the court. 5 Moreover, with
some modifications to accommodate the requirements of interna-
tional trade law practice, the Rules of the Court of International
Trade are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6
The most significant aspects of the Customs Courts Act of 1980
are those relating to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the court
and conferring upon it the power to grant appropriate relief,
whether legal or equitable.7 The Act was intended to afford persons
involved in international trade disputes the same access to judicial
review and judicial remedies as is available to other persons who
deem themselves aggrieved by administrative action. More than
two years after the law's enactment, it is now appropriate to review
how the Court of International Trade has addressed the elemental
issues which have arisen in the interpretation and application of its
new statutory authority.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Much of the court's work involves the application of adminis-
trative law. Administrative law has been defined as "the system of
legal principles which settle the conflicting claims of executive or
administrative authority on the one side, and of individual or pri-
vate right on the other."'8 More recently, Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis, author of a leading work on administrative law, described
administrative law as:
not the substantive law produced by the agencies, and . . . not
the substantive law created by legislative bodies or courts and
administered by the agencies; instead administrative law is the
law that governs the powers and procedures of the agencies.9
In its broadest terms, administrative law is the law which gov-
erns the machinery of government. It determines the manner in
which agencies may exercise the powers delegated to them. It fur-
ther provides courts with the remedial devices which make judicial
4. Id. § 256(b).
5. Id. § 2641(a).
6. For the procedure in the Court of International Trade, see id. §§ 2631 et seq.
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1582, 1585 (Supp. IV 1980). See S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979); H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
8. E. FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW I (1911), quoted in 1 K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 3 n.3 (1958).
9. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 2 (2d ed. 1978).
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review of administrative actions meaningful.' 0
Numerous cases have caused the Court of International Trade
to examine the adjudicatory, investigatory, supervisory,
prosecutorial and advisory powers of the various federal agencies
and officials involved in the administrative decision-making pro-
cess. In some instances, the court has affirmed and applied tradi-
tional doctrines of administrative law. In other cases, the court has
fashioned novel applications of the principles and rules of adminis-
trative law.
A few specific examples may prove enlightening. As an exer-
cise of its traditional jurisdiction, Mount Washington Tanker Co. v.
United States" represents the court's affirmation of the basic prin-
ciples of administrative law. In Mount Washington, an oil tanker,
documented under the laws of the United States, was repaired by a
foreign crew while the ship was on the high seas. The court inter-
preted the pertinent acts of Congress and held that, for the purposes
of the customs laws, ship repairs made on the high seas were made
in a "foreign country."' 2 In examining whether the plaintiff was
entitled to a remission of duties, the court discussed the principles
of administrative law which govern judicial review of the discre-
tionary authority reposed in the Secretary of the Treasury. Based
on the reasoning of Suwannee Steamship Co. v. United States,'3 the
court held that the Secretary's authority to remit duties was subject
to judicial review.' 4 The court noted that the decisional law on the
subject indicates that the scope and standard of review, in cases of
express delegation of discretionary authority, are of a limited na-
ture.' 5 If it is shown that the decision of the administrative official
or agency has a rational basis in fact and is not contrary to law, the
court will sustain the administrative decision. The court pointed out
that it will not substitute its discretion for that of the administrator.
Judicial review must be available, however, to assure that the dis-
cretion is not abused and is exercised reasonably within the inten-
tion of the governing legislation.'
6
More recent cases, involving the court's expanded jurisdiction,
10. The types of relief that the Court of International Trade may order are specified in
the 1980 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2643.
11. I Ct. Int'l Trade 32, 505 F. Supp. 209 (1980), a'd, 665 F.2d 340 (Fed. Cir. 1981).
12. 505 F. Supp. at 215.
13. 435 F. Supp. 389 (Cust. Ct. 1977).
14. 505 F. Supp. at 211-12.
15. Id. at 212.
16. Id.
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have focused attention on other facets of administrative law. In
Haarman & Reimer Corp. v. United States, 7 the court was con-
cerned with the issue of whether, during the course of a dumping
investigation, a finding by the Department of Commerce that "criti-
cal circumstances" did not exist was judicially reviewable. The
negative finding as to the existence of "critical circumstances" was
made during the Commerce Department's preliminary determina-
tion that natural menthol imported from the People's Republic of
China was being, or was likely to be, sold in the United States at
less than fair value.' 8 The plaintiff contended that even though the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 did not specifically provide for judi-
cial review of a negative determination as to the existence of "criti-
cal circumstances," judicial review could be predicated upon the
court's residual jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).19 Cit-
ing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,2" plaintiff submitted that, in the
absence of a persuasive showing that Congress did not intend judi-
cial review of a final administrative determination, judicial review
would be available under general principles of administrative law
and the Administrative Procedure Act. 21 After applying the final
agency action test of Abbott Laboratories, the court concluded that
"the entire legislative scheme (of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
and the Customs Courts Act of 1980) . . .evinces a congressional
intent to bar judicial review of the agency action in question.
22
Juxtaposed to Haarman & Reimer is Republic Steel Corp. v.
United States .23 In that action, Republic Steel sought judicial re-
view of a Commerce Department finding, made in the course of a
countervailing duty investigation, that certain coal subsidy pro-
grams did not constitute a subsidy within the meaning of 19 U.S.C.
17. 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 148, 509 F. Supp. 1276 (1981), reh'g denied, I Ct. Int'l Trade 207
(1981).
18. See Tariff Act of 1930 § 731, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV 1980).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (Supp. V 1981) provides in pertinent part:
(i) [T]he Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises
out of any law of the United States providing for -
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for reasons
other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise
for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in
paragraphs (i)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of this section.
20. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
21. 509 F. Supp. at 1278.
22. Id. at 1279.
23. 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 17 (1982).
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§ 167lb(b).24 The subsidy finding in question was one of many
contained in what was predominantly an affirmative preliminary
countervailing duty determination as to the West German steel
industry.
The government moved to dismiss on the basis that the Com-
merce Department's determination was monolithic and had to be
viewed in its entirety as an affirmative determination. Alterna-
tively, the government claimed that plaintiff was challenging nega-
tive aspects of an affirmative determination. In either event, the
government contended that judicial review was unavailable prior to
the Commerce Department's final determination.25
After considering the various provisions of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979 dealing with the reviewability of negative deter-
minations, and reviewing relevant legislative history, the court
rejected the government's contentions. The court held that the
characterization of the overall determination as an indivisible af-
firmative determination, which could not be judicially reviewed at
the preliminary stage, was "a highly questionable proposition."
Rather, the court found that it was
far more reasonable to treat an investigation of this type, into the
existence of more than one subsidy or involving more than one
producer, as resulting in a series of discrete and severable determi-
nations, each of which resolves a question of whether imported
merchandise was receiving a subsidy. In these terms, a prelimi-
nary determination that a particular practice is not a subsidy is a
negative determination. A preliminary determination that a par-
ticular producer is not receiving a subsidy is a negative
determination.
26
The government's motion to dismiss was denied, and the court took
jurisdiction over the action.27
In the context of the recent steel dumping and subsidy cases,
the court has also reviewed the Department of Commerce's discre-
tionary modification of the scope of a subsidy investigation in a
countervailing duty proceeding initiated by a private party. In a
second case, Republic Steel Corp. v. United States,2" the plaintiff
filed a petition alleging that the steel products in question were the
24. Id. at 17-18.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 19 (emphasis added in part).
27. Id.
28. 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 33, 544 F. Supp. 901 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-34 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 6, 1982).
5
Re: International Trade Law and the Role of the Lawyer
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1983
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
beneficiaries of subsidies from ten European countries and the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC).29
After reviewing plaintiffs petition, the Commerce Department
instituted a subsidy investigation of certain European nations, but
not the EEC. The Commerce Department contended that it would
investigate the existence of EEC subsidies by including them in its
investigation of each European nation. Plaintiff contended that the
language of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 required the Com-
merce Department to treat the EEC and the existence of EEC sub-
sidies separately from its investigation of the individual European
countries. The court agreed with the plaintiff, holding that in a sit-
uation where a private party petition triggers a subsidy proceeding,
the Department of Commerce has a limited ministerial function.
30
The court stated that the Department of Commerce "has an obliga-
tion to maintain the proceeding in a form which corresponds to the
petition. . . . This means that it must not do anything which has
the effect of altering the over-all investigation by precluding, or
making discretionary, that which should be mandatory."
'31
United States Cane Sugar Refiners'Ass'n v. Block 3 2 questioned
the President's authority to impose both duties and a quota on the
importation of sugar. One of the major issues was whether plaintiff
had exhausted its administrative remedies prior to bringing the ac-
tion. After reviewing the governing statutes and case law, the court
assumed jurisdiction over the action and held, in an opinion by
Judge Newman, that review by the Customs Service would prove
futile in view of the fact that the President's proclamation legally
foreclosed the customs officials from granting the relief sought by
plaintiff.3 3 Relying on United States v. Bush & Co 34 the court con-
cluded that the President's action was authorized by the relevant
statutes. The court was therefore precluded from inquiring or
probing into the reasoning which prompted the President's
29. 544 F. Supp. at 903.
30. Id. at 904.
31. Id. While the appeal in this action was subjudica by the Court of Appeals for the
Fedral Circuit, the United States and EEC governments settled the underlying steel dispute.
Thereafter, the Federal Circuit Court issued an order pursuant to United States v. Munsing-
wear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950), vacating the judgment of the lower court and remand-
ing the action for dismissal on the grounds of mootness. Subsequently, this action was
dismissed as moot. 5 Ct. Int'l Trade -, slip. op. 83-1 (Jan. 6, 1983).
32. 544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), al'd, 683 F.2d 399 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 895.
34. 310 U.S. 371 (1940).
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actions.35
Trade adjustment assistance cases, such as Woodrum v. Dono-
van,36 have afforded the opportunity to reexamine the mandatory
nature of various administrative procedures. In Woodrum, the Sec-
retary of Labor failed to publish certain Federal Register notices
and to conduct an investigation into the plaintiff's petition for certi-
fication of eligibility for trade adjustment assistance benefits. The
court concluded that the pertinent statutory provisions required the
Secretary to observe those administrative procedures because they
were intended to protect important rights conferred upon the
plaintiff.
37
Other applications of administrative law principles are evident
in the court's recent decision in United States v. Bavarian Motors,
Inc.3 In that case, an administrative agency sought enforcement
of administrative action prior to the completion of the administra-
tive review process. After examining the applicable case law, Judge
Maletz concluded that the doctrine of the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies applied with equal force to both the government and
private parties. The court found no reason for a different standard
to prevail depending upon the party who instituted the lawsuit.
These cases illustrate how the Court of International Trade has
interpreted and applied the jurisdictional provisions contained in
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and the Customs Courts Act of
1980. Moreover, these cases demonstrate the court's commitment
to striking a proper balance between the interests of the executive
and administrative authorities vis a vis the rights of aggrieved
parties.
II. EQUITY JURISDICTION
In addition to the expansion of its subject matter jurisdiction,
the conferral of plenary equity jurisdiction on the Court of Interna-
tional Trade is the most important single consequence of the Cus-
toms Courts Act of 1980.1' Equity, at early common law, was a
35. The Supreme Court stated in Bush: "The President's method of solving the problem
was open to scrutiny neither by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, nor by us." Id. at
379.
36. 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 46, 544 F. Supp. 202 (1982), reh'g denied, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 130
(1982).
37. 544 F. Supp. at 205.
38. 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 83 (1982).
39. See Re, Litigation before the United States Court of International Trade, 26 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 437, 442 (1981).
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jurisprudential system which existed apart from the ordinary courts
of law. The term "equity" denotes the spirit of fairness, justice and
good conscience which should govern all human activity. Equity
seeks to mitigate the rigor of legal rules and is grounded in ethical
rather than legal considerations.
Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., affectionately dubbed the last
of the Harvard Chancellors, made the following pertinent observa-
tions about the nature and scope of equity: "Equity is a way of
looking at the administration of justice; it is a set of effective and
flexible remedies admirably adapted to the needs of a complex soci-
ety; it is a body of substantive rules".'
The principal thrust of Professor Chafee's comments is that eq-
uity is flexible and adaptable. Without the power to do equity, the
Customs Court could not properly carry out its assigned task; it
could not provide complete justice for international trade litigants.
This limitation upon the court's remedial powers lead to a confus-
ing and bifurcated system of judicial review. The result was an
abundance of inconsistent judicial decisions. Some litigants ob-
tained relief, while others were denied relief because they had se-
lected the wrong forum in which to institute suit. With equity
powers, the Court of International Trade may now render complete
justice and adjust the conflicting rights and claims of all parties in-
volved in international trade disputes. This adjustment is not lim-
ited to litigation between individuals, but also includes, and indeed
is most appropriate, in balancing the rights of private parties and
those of the public and society.
With 28 U.S.C. § 1585 as the basis of its authority,4' the Court
of International Trade has begun to implement equitable principles
and remedies in international trade litigation. The most recurrent
issue of equity before the court is that of injunctive relief. In a
series of cases, the court has defined the essential factors which it
will consider before granting a preliminary injunction. In American
Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States,42 the court set forth the
factors that will be considered in granting a preliminary injunction:
(1) the threat of immediate irreparable harm; (2) that the public
interest would be better served by issuing rather than denying the
40. Chafee, Foreword to E. RE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY iii (1955); see also E. RE,
REMEDIES 229 (1982).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1585 provides: "The Court of International Trade shall possess all the
powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court of the United
States."
42. I Ct. Int'l Trade 293, 515 F. Supp. 47 (1981).
Vol. 13
8
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1983], Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol13/iss3/8
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
injunction; (3) the likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that
the balance of hardships on the parties favors plaintiff.
43
Although the party seeking an injunction bears the burden of
persuasion and a heavy burden of proof, the court in American Air
Parcel noted that the case law developed in the federal courts did
not require the plaintiff to sustain that high burden of proof as to
each of the four factors. Rather, the court indicated that the bal-
ance of the hardship test permits the exercise of sound discretion
and flexibility in the interaction of the four factors in granting or
denying a request for interlocutory injunctive relief. The court has
adopted a standard "under which the necessary showing on the
merits is governed by the balance of equities as revealed through an
examination of the other three factors.""
Attempts to prevent the disclosure of confidential business in-
formation have given the court two recent opportunities to exercise
its equitable power. In Saci/or, Acieries, et Laminoirs de Lorraine v.
United States,45 foreign steel producers sought to enjoin the De-
partment of Commerce from disclosing confidential information
submitted by them in the course of an antidumping duty investiga-
tion. The foreign producers alleged that the Commerce Depart-
ment's decision to release confidential business information to
counsel for domestic steel producers was based upon requests that
lacked the specificity and supporting reasons required by law and
the Commerce Department's regulations.46
In accepting jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the
court found no statute that expressly or implicitly precluded the
action. Judge Watson stressed that the disputed decision was one
clearly contemplated by Congress vhen it enacted section 1581 (i).
47
Moreover, in light of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,48 the
court viewed this action "as a conventional challenge to final
43. These factors were set forth by the United States Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals in S. J. Stile Associates v. Snyder, 646 F.2d 522 (1981). Although a preliminary injunc-
tion is not available unless all four factors are satisfied, the court will allow a lesser showing
of the likelihood of success on the merits if the hardship suffered would be substantial with-
out a preliminary injunction. See 515 F. Supp. at 53.
44. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours Inc., 559 F.2d
841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977), quoted in American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. U.S., 515 Supp.
47, 52 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
45. 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 191, 542 F. Supp. 1020 (1982).
46. 542 F. Supp. at 1021-22.
47. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 48 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3729, 3758-60.
48. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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agency action by an aggrieved party," and thus found it to be "in
harmony with the best principles of administrative law."'49
As to the merits, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 showed
"extreme sensitivity" to the handling of all confidential business in-
formation submitted in the course of an antidumping proceeding.
Section 777(c) of the Tariff Act of 193050 specifically requires the
requesting party to describe with particularity the information de-
sired and to set forth reasons for the request. The concomitant reg-
ulation51 requires a demonstration of good cause for disclosure and
imposes a duty upon the Secretary of Commerce to balance the
needs of the requesting party against the needs for continued
confidentiality.52
In reviewing the statute and the regulation, the court stated
that their requirements "must be viewed with the utmost serious-
ness," for they touch upon "some of the most sensitive decisions
that have to be made in the administrative process. ' 53 The court,
concluding that the Commerce Department failed to honor the
clear language of the statute and regulation, granted the foreign
producer's motion for injunctive relief.5 4 Judge Watson noted that
a determination by the Commerce Department to disclose confi-
dential business information must be the result of a reasoned deci-
sion which carefully evaluates the need of the applicant as opposed
to the demands of confidentiality.55
The Sadlor case was followed by Arbed, S.A. v. United
States,"6 in which foreign steel producers again sought injunctive
relief to prevent disclosure by the Commerce Department of confi-
dential business information submitted in the course of an an-
tidumping duty investigation. Arbed involved the same parties and
issues as Sacdor, except that in Arbed the Commerce Department
adhered to the requisite procedures.
The question before the court was whether the decision to re-
lease confidential business information was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. In
particular, the court dealt with the critical issue of the sufficiency of
49. 542 F. Supp. at 1023-24.
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c) (1980).
51. 19 C.F.R. § 353.30 (1982).
52. Sacilor, Acieries el Laminoirs de Lorraine, 542 F. Supp. at 1025.
53. Id at 1024.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 132 (1982).
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the need for disclosure to the domestic producers. The domestic
producers predicated their claim on a general need to examine, an-
alyze and comment on the information submitted by the plaintiffs
in order to present fully their views of the accuracy of the data and
the computations made by the Commerce Department. Princi-
pally, the domestic producers sought cost of production informa-
tion since it, instead of home market value, was used by the
Commerce Department as a basis for determining sales at less than
fair value.
The court rejected the foreign producers' contention that a
showing of general need was insufficient and that a showing of spe-
cific need was required. The court was not convinced that "the
general need to subject certain underlying data to critical scrutiny is
unreasonable, or that the verification of this data by the [depart-
ment] was intended to be the limit of its exposure in the investiga-
tion."57 The court stated that the Commerce Department must
have latitude in those areas where it reasonably expects that the
comments and the analyses of the parties will assist it. The court's
main concern with the exercise of the Commerce Department's dis-
cretion was not with the needs of a party as they relate to its full
and complete participation in the administrative process. Rather, it
was most important that "the needs of a party conform to, or rea-
sonably complement, the need of the agency to be as fully informed
as possible in arriving at the objectives of the investigation."58
The court concluded that while the general reasons found suf-
ficient for disclosure "may not compel disclosure," it was within the
Commerce Department's discretion to grant disclosure. The court
added a caveat, stating that its acceptance of the Commerce De-
partment's discretion was not final or absolute, and reserved to a
later proceeding a more refined analysis of the problem. Suffice it
to say that the court was satisfied that the Commerce Department
neither abused its discretion nor acted contrary to law. On that
basis, the court denied the foreign producers' request for injunctive
relief.
These cases have considered the substantive rules that must be
applied in resolving the competing claims for equitable relief. Eq-
uity's flexible and adaptable precepts will permit the Court of Inter-
national Trade to address effectively the questions that are critical
to the proper functioning of lawyers and business persons in today's
57. Id. at 136.
58. Id.
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highly competitive and changing world. In reaching its decisions in
these and other important international trade cases, the court will
continue to strike that delicate balance between the rights of the
individual and the interests of the public and society.
III. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER
In each of the cases discussed, the question presented included
and required the interpretation and application of a statutory pro-
vision. Each judicial question dealt with the meaning of the appli-
cable statutory provision or term and its application to the facts of
the particular case. In the performance of this important judicial
function, the court has been greatly aided by the submission of
competent and helpful briefs prepared by counsel.
In the interpretation and application of a new statutory provi-
sion, as occurs in every case of novel impression, the lawyer has
perhaps the best opportunity to aid the client, the court and the
administration of justice. Seldom is the question presented so
clearly that the answer is to be found by a simple reading of the
plain language of the statute. After all, if the specific question
presented had been expressly answered by the explicit language of
the statute, the problem would not be before the court, but would
have been resolved at the administrative level. Indeed, problems of
statutory interpretation may arise even in cases in which the statu-
tory language seems clear. Justice Holmes has alerted us that "[a]
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."5 9
The court must often look to legislative history and other perti-
nent sources to determine the legislative purpose and intent that
will cast light on the meaning of statutory language. Indeed, many
of the cases presented for adjudication present problems that were
not specifically considered by the legislature. These are the cases
where there exists a void or lacuna which the court must fill. This
category represents that large area of decided cases in which it has
been said that the judiciary is permitted to legislate "interstitially,"
that is, it may fill the interstices of the statute. Again, we are re-
minded of Justice Holmes who stated: "I recognize without hesita-
tion that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
59. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
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interstitially. ... 60 In the face of congressional silence, the court
must "discern dispositive legislative intent by 'projecting as well as
it could how the legislature would have dealt with the concrete situ-
ation if it had but spoken.' "61
Most of the court's recent cases have dealt with problems of
statutory interpretation and application, and much can be learned
on that important subject by a reading of these cases. They discuss
and apply the most authoritative sources on what has been tradi-
tionally called "statutory construction." Further, they review fun-
damental principles and canons of interpretation for these
legislative acts.
As in many other cases recently decided by the court, decisions
by the United States Supreme Court, as well as the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the other courts of
appeals, are points of beginning. The teachings of the federal
courts are most helpful and usually provide an excellent point of
departure in the search for the specific solution to the particular
international trade problem presented.62
Once legislative intent has been ascertained, the court must ap-
ply the meaning found. Clearly, in all cases, it is the function of the
court to give effect to the legislative purpose. It cannot be ques-
tioned that, in areas in which the Congress can speak with final
authority, the court must strive to implement and fulfill the legisla-
tive will and to be faithful to the legislative purpose.6 3
On other occasions, I have had the opportunity of highlighting
the contribution that the bar may make by the thorough and com-
petent presentation of cases. I have stated that the responsibility of
counsel to present competently the facts of a case cannot be dis-
puted. Obviously, the court is not expected to know the facts.
Apart from the doctrine of judicial notice, cases are decided on the
basis of the record made at the trial. Counsel's responsibility, how-
60. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
61. District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), citing City of
Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1967), quoted in Asahi Chemical Industry Co.
v. U.S., 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 120, 124, 548 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (1982).
62. See American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 293, 515
F. Supp. 47 (1981). This case held that 28 U.S.C. § 1581 accomplishes, as to the Court of
International Trade, the same purpose served by § 1331 (federal question jurisdictional pro-
vision) for the district courts. The court analogized Supreme Court and federal court of
appeals cases to reach this conclusion.
63. See generally Mount Washington Tanker Co. v. U.S., I Ct. Int'l Trade 32, 36-37, 40-
41, 505 F. Supp. 209, 212, 215-16 (1980); Elizabeth River Terminals, Inc. v. U.S., 1 Ct. Int'l
Trade 165, 174-75, 509 F. Supp. 517, 523-24 (1981).
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ever, is not limited to the competent presentation of the facts of the
case; counsel is also responsible for the competent presentation of
the applicable law. 64
All lawyers know, as do all judges, that there is no substitute
for careful and painstaking preparation. Thorough preparation is
not merely an obligation or responsibility owed to the client. It is a
professional responsibility with ramifications that directly affect
counsel's duty to the court. The counselor acts as an officer to the
court as well as to society in general. Although the immediate ob-
jective is the vigorous presentation of the case so that counsel may
succeed, the contribution to the judicial process goes beyond the
success of the moment. Counsel's presentation of the case, if pro-
fessionally competent, should render valuable assistance to the
court or judge charged with the responsibility of decision.65
This realization of the role of counsel adds a new dimension to
the indispensable requirements of thorough preparation and com-
petent presentation of a case. The lawyer, by applying professional
skills, will succeed in attaining several goals. First, counsel will dis-
charge the responsibility to the client; second, counsel will render
necessary assistance to the court or judge who must decide the case
justly and according to law; and third, counsel will perform a vital
public function in shaping, developing and improving the law
itself.66
Too often judges and the public, as well as lawyers, think of
the decisional process as the sole responsibility of the judge. That
belief falls far short of reality and does violence to the cooperative
effort that must prevail between bench and bar if the adversary sys-
tem is to function fairly and succeed.
For too long, attempts to understand the judicial process have
focused solely on the mental process of the judge. The judicial pro-
cess seemed naturally to imply the judge's mental process. The in-
quiry seemed to be: How does the judge decide the case presented?
What factors does the judge consider and what are the elements
that motivate the judicial decision?
67
It is time we recognize that the lawyer also has an essential role
64. See Re, The Lawyer as a Lawmaker, 52 A.B.A. J. 159 (1966).
65. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 69 A.B.A. J. 1671 (1983).
66. See Re, supra note 64.
67. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921); see also R.
ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1976); Re, Book Review, 38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 431, 433
(1976) (for helpful insights on the methodology used by the courts to reach and justify judi-
cial decisions).
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in the judicial process. Most notable is the contribution made by
counsel's submission of competent briefs.
Justice Rossman, a former Justice of the Oregon Supreme
Court, summarized well the point I wish to make. He wrote: "If
better briefs are written, the courts will produce better decisions.
68
This statement highlights the direct relationship between the input
or contribution of the lawyer, who in the first instance must prepare
the case and submit authorities for adjudication, and the judicial
opinion which memorializes the law. Justice Brandeis stated the
point most candidly when he said: "A judge rarely performs his
functions adequately unless the case before him is adequately
presented.
69
The references to brief writing by these distinguished jurists
indicate that, by the proper performance of a professional responsi-
bility to the client, counsel is also fulfilling the important function
of helping to shape the judicial opinion and the law itself.7"
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress has provided the Court of International Trade with
the necessary powers to make judicial review a meaningful process
for those adversely affected by administrative decisions relating to
import transactions. In its two years of existence, the Court of In-
ternational Trade, with the able assistance of the bar, has begun to
develop its own specific applications of the principles of adminis-
trative law and equity.
The best joint efforts of bench and bar are necessary if the
court is to perform its important statutory function and to continue
to serve as an effective arm of the federal judiciary. Every lawyer
who practices before the court will have an opportunity to influence
its development in its early formative years. Together, bench and
bar can perform an invaluable public service, and illuminate the
complex and important world of international trade law.
68. Rossman, Appellate Practice and Advocacy, 34 OR. L. REV. 73 (1955).
69. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 470 (1916).
70. See The Adversary System. Influence of the Brief Upon the Judicial Opinion, in E.
RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 82-84 (5th ed. 1983).
15
Re: International Trade Law and the Role of the Lawyer
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1983
